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Abstract. Like many other higher education systems in the Western world, Dutch higher education 
underwent profound changes during the last decade. In this article we will present an overview of these 
changes, and try to formulate an analytical framework that might be suited to analyze this process. In 
order to set the stage, we will begin with an overview of the Dutch higher education system, in which the 
broad structure is described, and some trends are presented. Next, an overview is given of the 
retrenchment and restructuring operations with which Dutch higher education was confronted uring 
the last decade. Drawing, mainly, on public administration and political theory, we then attempt o 
formulate a framework for analysis. In this we focus on the Dutch higher education system as a policy 
network, and address the relationships that exist between the various key actors in the network: between 
government and higher education, among higher education institutions themselves, and among the 
different actors within the institutions, especially administrators and academics. In doing so, we hope to 
demonstrate that at all these levels some identical basic processes operate which to a large extent 
determine the outcomes of governmental policies aimed at changing the higher education system. 
Time and again the modern state stumbles over the academic system (Clark 1983:137) 
Higher education in the Netherlands 
The Dutch higher education system: structure and trends 
Within the Dutch higher education system three types of institutions can be 
discerned: universities, institutes for higher vocational education (HBO), and the 
Open University. In the Netherlands, with around 15 million people, there are 13 
universities, 86 HBO-institutions, all located throughout the country, and an Open 
University (distance ducation) in the south of the Netherlands, with 18 regional 
study centres dispersed throughout the country. As the Open University, because of 
its special nature, was not involved in the higher education policies which are 
considered in this article, no further attention shall be paid to it. 
All higher education institutions in the Netherlands are funded largely by 
government, the additional resources coming from teaching, research and services 
such as consultancy, performed for third parties. All institutions operate within the 
legal and funding framework set up by government. To further clarify the operation 
of the Dutch higher education system, some more detailed comments can be made 
regarding funding and student enrolment. 
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Funding 
Within Dutch higher education, three 'flows of funds' are discerned. The first flow of 
funds is the direct funding of institutions through government. Most of the 
governmental funding through this flow is based on normative models for 
universities and for HBO-institutions, the main difference being that the HBO- 
model does not contain a research component, as fundamental research is not 
considered a task for these vocationally oriented institutions. The principles 
underlying both models can be stated as follows (Ministry of Education and Science 
1988: 44): 
- a normative r lationship between duties and funds, from which funding rules are defined; 
- application of these rules produces a total amount (lump sum) which enables an institution to 
perform those activities which are funded by the government; 
- institutions are free to spend this lump sum as they wish, on condition that he agreed upon activities 
are carried out in a fitting manner. 
The central elements in the models are the number of students and, in the case of the 
universities, the volume of the so-called 'conditionally funded research', a non- 
student based allocation of research funds in which projects are initially funded for 
five years after which continuation isdependent on the quality assessment made by 
experts in their respective field. Although the total volume of conditionally funded 
research isfixed nationwide for 'many years ahead', allocation amongst institutions 
can alter because of the outcomes of the assessment procedure. The secondflow of 
funds is the funding of university research through an autonomous research 
organization (NWO), an intermediate body, since it receives its resources from 
government as well. Most of the projects funded through this second flow involve 
doctorate research. The thirdflow of funds is the funds generated by the institutions 
for contract/third party research. In 1986 the ratios for the three flows were: 62% 
first flow, 16% second flow, and 22% third flow, on a total of 11,241 full time 
equivalent staffunits (Ministry of Education and Science 1989: 199). At the moment 
the funding system is under eview. One of the most important changes uggested is 
the separation of teaching and research funding, equalizing the governmental 
teaching expenditure for both universities and HBO, and the allocation of research 
funds on a competitive basis through NWO (see De Vries 1990). 
Government funding for higher education has declined over the last decennium. 
As can be seen from Table 1, actual public expenditure has remained more or less 
Table 1. Public expenditure onhigher education i million Dfl. (constant prices; 1975= 100) 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
5,011 5,649 5,349 5,310 5,311 5,019 4,863 4,953 4,787 
100 113 107 106 110 97 99 96 
Source: Kaiser et al. 1991. 
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Table 2. Public expenditure per student in Dfl. by university and non-university sector (prices 1975) 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
18,706 15,336 14,942 14,133 13,441 12,519 11,993 12,052 11,566 
100 82 80 76 72 67 64 64 62 
12,353 12,388 11,464 11,283 11,324 10,885 10,799 11,190 10,208 
100 100 93 91 92 88 87 91 83 
Source." Kaiser et al. 1991. 
stable over the years, but no compensation has been made to cater for the increase in 
student numbers (Table 2). 
Student enrolment 
In the Netherlands, every student has the right to enrol as a student at either a 
university or an HBO-institution for 6 years, provided he/she meets the standard 
entry requirement of a secondary school diploma (see Figure 1). In 1988 some 
165,000 students were enrolled in university education, while some 220,000 students 
(including part-time) followed higher education in the HBO-sector. The right of 
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admission to higher education for everyone is a result of one of the principal 
objectives of Dutch higher education policy, namely to provide 'higher education 
for the many'. There are a limited number of courses for which a numerus clausus 
applies, either based on capacity within the universities or on labour market 
conditions. Every student is entitled to a basic grant provided by the government. 
Within the system, provisions are made for loans and supplementary grants, 
depending on parental income. In principle, only students under 30 years of age can 
obtain these grants and loans. 
Enrolments have increased steadily throughout most of the 1980s in both sectors 
of the system, and have exceeded original estimates. In combination with the 
existing rant system, this is creating at present substantial budgetary problems for 
the government, despite the apparent reduction i  terms of expenditure p r student. 
We will return to this when discussing the recent policy developments in the 
Netherlands. 
Policy change in Dutch higher education: restructuring and reform 
As stated above, during the 1980s higher education policy in the Netherlands 
underwent some profound changes. Basically, a distinction can be made between 
two types of policy change: the 'corrective' governmental policy initiatives that 
prevailed uring the first half of the decennium, and the 'option supplying' policies 
that evolved uring the second half. Especially the first type of policies has been 
geared towards increasing efficiency in the system. The latter type of policies relates 
to the introduction of a new 'steering philosophy' for higher education. However, 
since the often far-reaching and penetrating reforms and retrenchment operations 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s have left their mark on higher education, 
specifically with respect to the way the institutions perceive governmental action, a 
brief overview of these policies is called for. 
Corrective reforms and retrenchment 
The main thrust of the major reform and retrenchment operations that occurred 
during the eighties was directed at the universities. In 1981 the Two TierAct passed 
through parliament, restructuring university education. The objectives were to 
increase fficiency, stimulate shorter programmes, increase programme diversity 
and student choice, decrease actual duration of studies, stimulate planning and 
monitoring of study-load, and integrate university and HBO-education. These 
objectives were to be attained through the introduction of a 'first tier' with a four 
year duration, a limitation of the enrolment time-period to six years and the 
introduction of a 'second tier' in which selected students could follow specialized 
courses and research fellowships. At present, itappears that the objectives have only 
partly been reached (Bijleveld 1989). 
The introduction of the two tier structure was followed by a major retrenchment 
499 
operation i  1981, Task Reallocation and Concentration (TVC), in order to reduce 
the costs of the university sector, stimulate co-operation between disciplinary 
locations, concentrate r search activities, and prevent further disintegration. The 
cuts amounted toa total of Dfl. 258 million. Although this retrenchment operation 
has been only a partial success (Boorsma nd Koelman 1986; De Groot and Ritzen 
1988; Van Vught 1985), it has left its mark on Dutch academia, especially because it
was the first time severe budget cuts were carried through. In 1986 another 
retrenchment operation, Selective Contraction and Expansion (SKG), was forced on 
the universities. The TVC-operation was primarily efficiency-driven, without 
explicit reference to quality. The SKG-operation, asis indicated by the inclusion of 
'selective', tried to use quality arguments in the implementation of the budget-cuts. 
With respect o the research activities of universities, the government in 1983 
introduced the system of ConditionalFunding(CF) with the objectives of increasing 
accountability, promoting quality, and improving university research policy. The 
CF-system brought about several changes in research funding. First, the institution- 
al funding mechanism shifted from an enrolment-based system to a system based on 
norms and criteria, including those of scientific quality and societal relevance. 
Second, a system of quality assessment was introduced. Research programmes had 
to be approved by external bodies before they could be included in the CF-system. 
The results of the quality assessment processes were to be used for reallocation of 
budgets amongst the universities. When the system was introduced, the idea was to 
develop it on a basis of 'learning by doing': experiences gained would be used to 
further efine and adapt he system, so that in a number of years it would grow 
towards its final form. One of the main changes made in this process has been the 
replacement of ex ante quality assessments byex post assessments. In effect, the 
introduction of the CF-system has been the first attempt to introduce a formal 
system of quality assessment in Dutch higher education. Although the system is 
currently under eview because itdid not fully meet he government's expectations 
in identifying excellent from good research, it has resulted in the acceptance of 
external assessment by the academic ommunity (Bijleveld and Goedegebuure 
1989; Spaapen et al. 1988). However, quality first really appeared on the higher 
education agenda s a policy issue during the latter part of the 1980s, with the 
introduction ofa new steering philosophy by the Minister of Education and Science. 
A new governmental steering philosophy 
One of the criticisms that can be made regarding the retrenchment and restructuring 
operations described above, probably is that hey were all ad hoc, sometimes ven 
contradictory. In short, an overall policy framework was lacking, and the major 
underlying factor was budgetary constraint. Since 1985 a more encompassing and 
general policy framework has emerged, with the respective publications of the 
Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality document (HOAK 1985), the Higher 
Education and Research Plans (HOOP 1988, 1990) and the Higher Education and 
Research-bill (WHW 1988). 
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In the HOAK-document, a new steering philosophy as presented by the minister, 
was deemed necessary because: 
many in and around the higher education system are of the opinion that he present administrative and 
legislative higher education mechanism can no longer be considered optimal to meet he future 
demands which have to be placed on the system (Ministry of Education and Science 1985: 9). 
The central concept of the philosophy is a substantial increase in the autonomy of 
the institutions through abolishing regulations, combined with the introduction of a 
system of retrospective quality control. This concept is the result of a departmental 
analysis of the existing policy instruments by which government has been steering 
the higher education system. This analysis howed that: 
- control is not general enough and the units with which it is concerned are too 
small; 
- partly for this reason, anumber of instruments does not work as well as it might; 
- insufficient justice is done to the institution's own responsibilities, particularly 
regarding teaching; and 
- quality control and testing have not taken on a definite form (Ministry of 
Education and Science 1988: 23). 
By granting institutions more autonomy, the minister strives towards a situation in 
which institutions themselves, through direct interaction with societal sub-systems, 
can react to the signals they receive, translating these into institutional policy- 
making. Necessary conditions for this are, amongst others, a strong and effective 
institutional management. The HOAK-document pictures a new image of ad- 
ministrative thought and action. Institutions are required to operate more in 
accordance with market developments and be more professional. Attention is 
focused on profiles, increases in performance and graduation rates, a diversified 
student supply, and better adjustment of course supply in relation to labour market 
demands. In order to facilitate these shifts in institutional behaviour, governmental 
steering will no longer be directed at the discipline level, but at a more aggregate l vel 
of 'sectors' of several disciplines. Governmental interference below the sector level is 
limited to the following grounds: 
- if macro-efficiency would be harmed, i.e., if the introduction by an institution of 
a new course in a subject for which the capacity already far exceeded the demand, 
would constitute a waste of resources; 
- if the course was clearly of sub-standard quality; or 
- if it could not reasonably be considered as falling into one of the assigned sectors 
(e.g., starting amedical course within the law sector) (Ministry of Education and 
Science 1988: 29). 
The complementary aspect of the enlarged institutional autonomy is the system of 
quality control. As stated in all recent governmental documents on this topic: 'the 
501 
abolition of regulations with which institutions must comply in advance, goes hand 
in hand with stringent output control'. It is left to the institutions themselves to 
develop asystem which will generate both quantitative and qualitative information. 
However, if institutional efforts in this are below standard, the government retains 
the option to take over the monitoring of standards through an independent higher 
education i spectorate, which at the moment is already constituted.t 
The third basic change in governmental policy-making presented inthe HOAK- 
document, is the introduction of a new system of planning and funding. In 1987 the 
draft Higher Education and Research Plan (HOOP) was published, a five-volume 
document circulated for consultation and comment, including analyses of the 
higher education system, policy proposals, facts and figures and financial schemes. 
The final version was published in February 1988. The HOOP is an essential 
ingredient in the newly proposed two-year planning cycle. In the first year of the 
cycle, the government produces the HOOP, in which problems and issues are set out 
which the minister believes require particular attention i the planning period. This 
'agenda' is then discussed with the institutions. In the second year, the institutions 
produce their development plans, stating how they will address the issues raised and 
what their future course of action will be. The next HOOP in turn will address these 
plans and relate them to the present problems and issues, resulting in a new agenda, 
etc. The system is constructed in the form of a dialogue between government and 
institutions, designed to increase their involvement in the community. 
One of the central issues which has been raised in the first HOOP is the 
construction of institutional profiles and the formulation of institutional missions. 
Institutions are expected to develop long-term strategic plans stating their views and 
positions on both demand and supply of teaching, and research priorities. An 
institutional profile should distinguish an institution from others, while at the same 
time serve to strengthen the separate identities of the university and the HBO- 
subsystems a a whole. In the HOOP, emphasis placed on institutional outputs, 
among others, translated in proposals for the present funding, including the 
introduction of a student voucher system and a so-called 'mission budget', to further 
underline the quasi-market approach to which government has turned and which 
the institutions are expected to follow. 
The concept of a mission budget has been introduced on the grounds that the 
minister retains his own responsibilities for guaranteeing pluriformity and variety of 
the system within the framework of institutional self-regulation. I  those instances 
where required evelopments originate too slowly or insufficiently, the minister can 
exercise his political responsibility by allocating a mission budget. It can be seen as 
an incentive for institutions to adequately react and adapt to environmental 
developments. 
If the HOOP can be seen as an administrative translation of the philosophy 
presented in the HOAK-document, he WHW-bill can be seen as its legislative 
translation. It formalizes the replacement of central government regulation with the 
decentralization f powers to the higher education institutions. At the time of 
writing, the bill is under discussion i  parliament. However, in the period between 
the publication of the draft-bill and the parliamentary discussion, some important 
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events occurred. First of all, because of strong dissent within both the higher 
education community and the political parties, the idea of a voucher system has 
been dropped for the time being. Second, and most important, a new government 
came to power, which resulted in a change of Minister for Education and Science. 
The christian-democrat Deetman was replaced by the labour party candidate 
Ritzen, previously professor of economics at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. 
Even though Ritzen indicated that in general he would follow the overall policy 
direction set out by Deetman in terms of'government at arm's length', he amended 
the WHW-bill on some fundamental points (Government Amendment, 21 073, no. 
5). 
First of all, the 'sector' is taken out of the bill and replaced by a 'Central Register 
of Higher Education Courses': a database containing information on courses and 
subject areas, and the outcomes of the quality assessment processes discussed above. 
Only those courses which are registered will be funded by the government and will 
be able to award certified egrees. Also, students will be eligible for student support 
(grants and loans) only if enrolled for registered courses. If the quality assessments 
result in negative judgements for a number of years (not further specified) the course 
will be dropped from the register, implying no government funding, student 
support, or certified iplomas. 
Second, the institutional registration fee is no longer fixed; institutions can vary 
the amount, however, the maximum is set by the government. 
Third, the right for institutions to determine the yearly entrance numbers will be 
incorporated in the Act, on the condition that these numbers will not be less than 
70% of the average inflow during the last three years. If student demand exceeds 
available places, institutional capacity for those areas hould be expanded to at least 
125% of the average capacity over the last two years. 
Fourth, the concept of the 'mission budget' is taken out of the Act. 
Fifth, possibilities for institutional co-operation between HBO and universities 
are enlarged. However, separate programmes and degrees, in terms of the binary 
distinction, should remain visible. 
Sixth, ex  ante  approval of the institutional budget is no longer equired, nor are 
development plans. Control will be based on the yearly institutional accounts, 
which should also incorporate a section containing the institutional p ans regarding 
future developments. The abolition of the development plan as an institutional 
document basically removes the rationale for the HOOP cycle discussed above. 
The arguments for these rather drastic hanges in the WHW-bill are first, that he 
concept of the 'sector' would not really be workable. Not only did it prohibit flexible 
institutional daptation to changing needs in society, because an institution was 
confined in its 'adaptive responses' to the allocated sectors, but also the sector 
system insufficiently clarified the educational programmes available. Programmes 
with the same name, could be completely different at different institutions, and 
programmes with different names, because of different sectors, could basically be 
very similar. The 'register' system, according to the minister, would inform more 
adequately on the similarity and diversity of higher education programmes. Be this 
as it may, it also means asubstantial change in the steering level of higher education 
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policy. The original idea of the introduction ofthe sector level was that hrough this 
construct governmental steering would no longer be directed at the programme 
level, because this did not correspond with the overall philosophy of 'government at 
arm's length'. The proposed change again redirects governmental steering at the 
programme l vel, especially because of the connection between quality assessment 
and governmental funding. 
Regarding the 'liberation' of the registration fee, the argument is that institutions 
will be able to offer a favourable price/quality ratio to students, with the database 
providing the possibility for students to check this ratio. In this way 'some room for 
competition between i stitutions i  created, enlarging the dynamics and diversity in 
higher education' (Government Amendment, 21073, no. 5). An essential element in 
this is the suggested 'purity' of the information available through the assessment 
procedures. We will return to this below, arguing that one can have severe doubts 
about he viability of such a system. However, it should be emphasized that these 
amendments are proposals and not established government policy. Already 
parliament has expressed its doubts about the viability of the amendments. It 
remains to be seen to what extent, if at all, they will be incorporated in the final Act. 
This will also shed some more light on the political relationship between the minister 
and parliament (see further). 
With respect to the relationship between universities and HBO-institutions, it is 
hard to imagine what institutional co-operation i terms of programmes should 
occur if the binary divide is to remain explicitly visible, especially since new forms of 
education between university and HBO education are certainly not intended. 
Regarding the binary nature of the Dutch higher education system, it seems 
appropriate to focus on the developments that have led to the structure of the 
HBO-sector as we now know it, since this very likely will have some profound effects 
on the future structure of the Dutch system. 
Although the distinction in two types of policies, the 'corrective' and 'option 
supplying' ones, fits the purpose of a classificatory scheme, it is not fool-proof. One 
important government-induced r structuring operation rests somewhat uneasily in 
this dichotomy, namely, the merger operation which fundamentally changed the 
structure and role of the non-university (HBO) sector of higher education 
(Goedegebuure 1989). The operation, entitled Scale-enlargement, Task-reallocation 
and Concentration (STC), was started in 1983 with the basic objective of 
strengthening the HBO-institutions both in a managerial nd an educational sense 
so as to become a full part of the higher education system - equal but different in 
relation to the universities. Or, to use a different phrase, the objective was to 
'upgrade' the HBO-institutions (Teichler 1988). In this respect, STC was the 
eventual implementation f discussions and ideas on the structure and position of 
the non-university sector, dating back to the mid- 1970s. Before the STC-operation, 
the HBO-sector consisted of approximately 350 small, mono-purpose institutions of 
which two-thirds had an enrolment level of less than 600 students. By 1987 the 
number of institutions dropped to some 85, out of which 51 were large to very large, 
mostly multi-purpose institutions. At present mergers till continue within the 
HBO-sector. The end result of this wholesale restructuring has been that HBO has 
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become a potentially powerful force next to the universities in the Dutch higher 
education system. However, ithas also meant hat the sector has been in turmoil for 
some five years, and is still settling down from the not always easy and supple 
organizational nd structural change process. This to a large extent accounts for the 
fact that, for example, the developments regarding a system of quality assessment 
appear to lag behind those in the university sector. However, the results of the 
merger operation also show the potential strength of a government operating at 
arm's length. Contrary to the retrenchment operations of the early half of the 1980s 
in which the government's role was dominant and penetrating, the STC-operation 
was structured insuch a way that only a limited number of boundary conditions was 
specified by the government, no fixed goals in terms of number of mergers or 
institutions were stated, and the actual process was left to the institutions and the 
HBO-Council themselves. In effect, the policy adopted strongly resembles the basic 
concepts that were to be incorporated in the new steering philosophy described 
above. 
Towards a framework for analyzing policy change 
As has been described above, Dutch higher education has undergone a number of 
more or less far-reaching reforms and retrenchment operations, the outcomes of 
which only partially correlate with the stated objectives. On the one hand, this can 
be seen as underpinning Clark's often quoted statement that higher education 
changes only gradually and incrementally (Clark 1983:182). On the other hand, it 
also can be seen as an indicator of the opposite, that is to say that it is remarkable in
the light of the often stated barriers to change in higher education (see, e.g., Becher 
and Kogan 1980; Cerych and Sabatier 1986; Van Vught 1989) that Dutch higher 
education has changed as much as it has. Whatever position one prefers to take, it is 
beyond oubt that, through the various interactions between the key actors in the 
system, a certain amount of change has occurred, as well as that the dynamics of 
interaction have resulted in both intended and unintended outcomes of these change 
processes. 
Below we attempt o formulate an analytical framework that can be used for 
empirically assessing the change processes confronting Dutch higher education - a 
framework that might also have some wider use in analyzing policy change and its 
outcomes in higher education in general, as it is based on a number of general 
notions and assumptions drawn from the social sciences. Since these theoretical 
statements relate to the interactions that occur between the various actors who 
operate within the higher education system, as a first step in formulating the 
framework an analysis of the system in terms of relations and interactions i  called 
for. In this, the higher education system will be approached as an inter- 
organizational network. In this approach we will also formulate some propositions 
about he behaviour of the key actors or organizations within this specific network. 
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The Dutch higher education system." an inter-organizational network 
The Dutch higher education system and the policies relating to it can be considered 
to be the resultant of the behaviour of a number of organizations that can all be 
viewed as more or less public, governmental organizations. On the one hand, this 
means that the individuals and organizations in the field of higher education behave 
in principle like all other individuals or organizations: they strive for maximization 
of their own utility (De Alessi 1983; Lieshout 1984; Moe 1984; Westerheijden 1988). 
As Clark points out: 'He who says academic organization says interest groups' 
(1983: 10). On the other hand, the context of these individuals and organizations has 
some consequences forthe way these principles will be transformed into observable 
behaviour. Most important here is the fact that the organizations together form an 
inter-organizational etwork of (mainly) governmental organizations ( ee Figure 
2). 
The system itself, from an analytical point of view, can be divided into a number 
of separate r lationships which are related to the different positions occupied by the 
actors. A well-known structuring of these relations i the distinction made by Clark 
205-206) in understructure, middle structure and superstructure. Worthwhile as this 
analytical concept is, both for our purposes and for the reality of the Dutch system, 
we propose a slightly more detailed istinction, based on the functional relation- 
ships that exist in the system. We discern the following: 
1. the political relationship between the minister and parliament; 
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2. the administrative r lationship between the minister and the higher education 
institutions; 
3. the inter-institutional re ationships; and 
4. the intra-institutional re ationships. 
Within these relationships a number of essential dependencies xists, which, as we 
will argue later, to a large extent influences the outcomes of government-initiated 
reforms or changes in the system. 
The political relationship between the minister and parliament 
Among the governmental organizations in the field of higher education, the 
Ministry of Education and Science is by far the largest. It occupies itself mostly with 
the educational nd research institutions, and for that reason alone it would make a 
good candidate to be called a central actor. The 'power of the purse' it wields 
vis-a-vis the higher education institutions i another eason, as is the relationship 
between the Ministry and parliament. The Ministry of Education and Science 
provides parliament with almost all of parliament's proposals relating to education 
and sciences, both for budgets and for policies. Yet parliament is far from powerless 
in its relationship with the Ministry, for without parliamentary consent a ministry 
would not be able to spend a single guilder or make a single regulation. As long as 
processes in the relationship do not escalate much above the normal level of 
intensity, however, most decisions are made within the Ministry, while parliament 
exerts only marginal influence. 2 In the daily routine of decision-making, parliament 
cannot control and sanction all of a ministry's actions. This gives the Ministry 
leeway to take action without explicit parliamentary consent: as long as no dissent is 
heard, parliament is supposed to give its consent. Only when the Ministry has to 
deliberate with parliament by rule (as when a draft of law is to become alaw), and in 
case conflicts arise between parliament and the Ministry (represented by its 
minister), the odds are in favour of parliament, because it can force a minister to 
resign. The power relationships between a minister and parliament are, therefore, 
complicated: as long as consultation of parliament is not required, a minister (and 
the Ministry) may be reckoned to occupy the most powerful position, but as soon as 
debates tart in the plenary session of parliament, he relationship is reversed and 
parliament is more powerful than the minister. 
The administrative relationship between the minister and the higher education 
institutions 
The raison d'Otre for the higher education system is education and research. The 
universities and the HBO-institutions can be considered to be the central 
organizations in the system. For their (financial) means of existence they are 
primarily dependent on the political institutions, viz., parliament, minister, and the 
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Ministry of Education and Science. From the perspective ofthe universities and the 
HBO-institutions, their relations with the political institutions are the most 
important, simply because these institutions decide upon the budgets; budgets et 
the 'limits of behaviour' for universities and HBO just as much as for any other 
organization: ' . . .  the range of services any agency can provide is determined 
ultimately by the money it is authorized to spend. Money talks, in administration as 
elsewhere' (Rourke 1969: 25). The relationships with other organizations are in this 
respect much less important for the higher education institutions. Almost all the 
financial resources are provided by the Ministry, while the subsidies by the 
Netherlands' Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) or contracts with social 
or commercial organizations (primarily business firms) account for only a small 
part of the income. Moreover, the political institutions are also important as regards 
the legitimation of universities and HBO in society (especially with respect to the 
societal effects of diplomas), although the (national and international) 'field' of the 
discipline, and sometimes social and commercial organizations, can play a part in 
this respect oo. It is not to be expected that the policies of universities can differ 
systematically, in the long run, from the preferences of policy-makers in the 
Ministry, provided these policy-makers have preferences regarding higher educa- 
tion and are able to use the (financial) relationships tofurther their preferences. It is 
this relation that makes the sector of higher education a 'semi-feudal conglomerate' 
of organizations (Allison 1971), in which, from the point of view of power elations, 
the position of the Ministry of Education and Science is higher than that of each of 
the institutions of higher education. 
However, this is only a partial view; the institutions themselves are certainly not 
completely powerless, bending to whatever isthrust upon them by the minister or 
his governmental officials. Not only do institutions possess power through their 
informal relations with parliament, 3 but also they are by definition the dominant 
providers of the educational nd research goods the government obtains on behalf 
of society at large - goods that are highly important and cannot be substituted very 
easily with something else. This makes the government with respect to the 'product', 
higher education, highly dependent on the institutions. In combination with the 
already noted high dependency of institutions on the government in terms of 
resources, the relationship between the minister and the institutions i  therefore best 
described in terms of mutual dependencies, as is indicated by Figure 3 (Scharpf 
1978: 355-356). 
It should be noted at this point that, as can be concluded from both exchange 
theory (Blau 1964; Levine and White 1961) and the resource dependence p rspective 
(Aldrich 1979; Benson 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the existence of mutual 
dependence r lationships does imply that governmental policies also have to be 
geared towards the preferences ofthe higher education i stitutions if they are to be 
effective in the long run. From this it can be hypothesized that the more 
governmental policies directed at change are in accord with existing preferences of the 
higher education institutions, the more likely it is that these policies will be successful in
attaining the government's objectives (see also Van Vught 1989). This may be a trite 
proposition, but we shall elaborate on it below. Moreover, it is understood that this 
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proposition is made ceteris paribus: it only applies to the relationship between the 
government and the higher education institutions, and there may be many other 
reasons why policies are not successful. 
Mutual dependence does not imply equality of both actors' power positions. 
While in a formal sense, the power of a ministry is quite extensive (it has 
discretionary powers, legitimately built into a wide array of policy regulations, 
which provide ample possibilities to apply or alleviate all degrees of pressure), it
lacks one essential ingredient inits array of powers, namely, information. Because of 
the specialized nature of the field of higher education, a ministry will never have 
enough useful information to fully steer the system in the desired irection. Through 
their almost monopolistic control of information, the institutions possess a strong 
source of power vis-gl-vis the Ministry; a source which enables them, in those 
instances inwhich policy change is perceived to be a threat o the status quo, to act in 
accordance with the ministerial change on the surface, but in effect act in a way 
which 'corrupts' the policy change from within. On-the-surface ompliance isthen 
combined with actual obstruction, the end result of which will be a situation that 
differs from the status quo, but that still to a large extent accords with the existing 
preferences of the higher education institutions. Or, as an elaboration of our first 
hypothesis, the more governmental policies directed at change differ from existing 
preferences within the higher education system, the more likely it is that these policies 
will only result in a limited amount of change through defensive institutional behaviour. 
Dutch higher education policy during the last decade provides a number of 
examples that appears to support both these hypotheses. With respect to the latter 
one, the developments in the field of quality control are indicative, while with 
respect to the first, the restructuring of the HBO-sector appears upportive. 
Quality assessment 
An example of the way in which institutions on the surface can act in accordance 
with a governmental policy aimed at change in the system, while at the same time 
working their way around it, is the implementation f the system of Conditional 
Funding (CF) of research. The system, introduced to increase accountability, 
quality, and institutional research policy, is based on two pillars, namely external 
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quality assessments and budget reallocations. On the basis of the outcomes of the 
assessments, reallocations according to whether esearch was judged as 'bad', 
'good', or 'excellent' were envisaged. Based on the results of their evaluation study 
of the CF-system, Spaapen et al. (1988:110) conclude that: 
... in the eyes of the institutions, [the] two most dangerous components of the CF-system, external 
assessment and reallocation, are being stripped of their thorns during the introduction process. 
Regarding the external ssessment, this is done by delegation a d encasement; thead hoc and the 
international element disappear; the organisation is placed in the hands of the VSNU, and the 
implementation n the hands of some important, with the universities related, bodies. Decisions on 
reallocation are put on a back burner. 
Taking this theme abit further, Bijleveld and Goedegebuure (1989) show that in the 
face of governmental ttempts to reinstall the dynamic interplay between assess- 
ment and reallocation, institutions managed to keep close to the status quo. Their 
proposals for reallocation effectively implied hardly any reallocation, while the 
assessment procedures remained a 'black box' to the government, with the assessing 
bodies not willing to make distinctions between good and excellent research. 
Bijleveld and Goedegebuure tentatively conclude that the universities have 
successfully fought the attempt of government to enlarge its grip on the scientific 
research system through the introduction of the CF-system. At present the system is 
under revision. 
Regarding the assessment of quality of teaching, a somewhat different picture 
emerges. In this area, more progress appears to have been made with the functioning 
of a system primarily directed at quality improvement (Vroeijenstijn and Acherman 
1990). Westerheijden poses that the dilemma regarding quality assessment is that 
'without he expectation of real consequences, the incentives to organise quality 
assessment are lacking; with the expectation of real consequences, quality 
assessment will turn into a power game' (Westerheijden 1990a: 205-206). The 
universities seem to have found a way around this dilemma, in that they try to 
reduce the consequences to educational consequences (improvement of courses), 
rather than financial consequences (reallocation or retrenchment). It is, however, 
too early to make positive statements about the universities' uccess to evade the 
dilemma, as the assessment system of teaching quality is only beginning to operate 
(Westerheijden 1990b: 22). Besides, an uncertain factor at the moment is the extent 
to which teaching-quality assessments will be linked with governmental policy 
(implying adirect financial relationship) by way of the quality registration envisaged 
in the WHW-bill. 
What these examples how with respect to university behaviour agrees with the 
hypotheses stated above. The universities have a strong power-base in their control 
over information i  their elationship with the government, and they use it if policies 
directed at change threaten the status quo. If no direct hreat is implied, university 
behaviour is more in line with policy objectives. 
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Restructuring the HBO-sector 
Through the STC-operation described above, the HBO-sector has been drastically 
restructured. Based on their evaluation study of the STC-operation, Goedegebuure 
and Vos (1988) conclude that attitudes towards the operation were positive from the 
start and became more so during the operation itself. An explanation for this can be 
found in the overall perspective underlying the restructuring operation. The basic 
aim has always been to upgrade the HBO-sector to an 'equal but different' 
counterpart of the university sector, to take it out of the legal confinements of the 
secondary education sector, and to restructure funding and management proce- 
dures. In this sense, the government, through its policy, heeded the calls for more 
autonomy, recognition of a higher education status, and changes in funding from 
within the HBO-sector. This coincidence ofpolicy direction and existing preferences 
has led Teichler to the observation that in effect he STC-operation could be seen as 
a non-controversial reform (Teichler 1986), and it can explain to a large extent why 
the ideas of the restructuring policy took hold in the HBO-sector in the first place, 
thereby supporting the hypothesis formulated above. It does not explain, however, 
why the STC-policy has been adopted to such a large extent. In general, merger- the 
predominant instrument inthe restructuring policies - is something an organization 
tends to avoid as much as possible, since it involves a loss of autonomy and alters 
existing power structures (e.g., Meek 1988; Millet 1976). In this sense, the results of 
the restructuring operation appear to contradict the second hypothesis formulated 
above, also implying that a framework restricted solely to the relationship between 
the government and the higher education institutions i too narrow to adequately 
address the issue of policy change in higher education. For a more complete 
framework, the inter- and intra-institutional re ationships should also be included. 
Inter-institutional relationships in the higher education system 
As we have argued above, the restructuring operation in the HBO-sector in its 
policy-design strongly resembled the 'remote control' concept that was introduced 
by the Dutch government in its HOAK and subsequent policy documents. In these, 
emphasis i placed on the introduction of 'market' notions in the system through 
competition, a focus on quality, performance, etc. It should be noted here that when 
the concept 'market' isused in Dutch higher education, we are dealing with a very 
specific type of market. There is a relatively small group of 'producers', the 
universities and HBO-institutions, and only one dominant 'buyer', the government, 
who is, with the exception of teacher training, not the consumer of the 'products', 
education and research. In this sense, no direct market relationship exists in the 
strict economic meaning. Students consume ducation, but are only marginally 
paying the costs for this, and society at large is using the 'benefits' of scientific 
research, but is only indirectly paying for it through taxes. 4The policy changes 
described earlier as 'option supplying' do not alter this. Students are not going to 
pay directly, e.g., through a voucher system, for their education, and research 
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money is still being allocated by government, albeit through an intermediate body 
(NWO) which is not a direct consumer either. In this respect no basic changes in 
'market relationships' are carried through. What is happening, is that more 
competition is introduced in the inter-institutional re ationships. Although we are 
treading on slippery ground here, since most of the changes are either still on paper 
or have only just been implemented, we will try to make some assessment ofpossible 
effects and consequences. These assessments are based on the theoretical notions 
regarding institutional behaviour introduced earlier. 
The main argument used by the government to support its change in overall 
policy direction is that, through releasing its former strong regulative grip on the 
system, introducing more competition, and intensifying 'output steering' primarily 
based on quality notions, the system itself will become more adaptive to changing 
environmental demands resulting in diversity and an increase in the 'overall quality' 
of the higher education system. A number of forces is at play at the inter- 
institutional level that might either promote or deflect diversity and an increase in 
quality. 
It has been shown that in general the overall change in policy direction by the 
government is supported in the higher education field (Binsbergen and De Boer 
1988). However, we also have to deal with inter-institutional dynamics. In this, 
strategic behaviour is likely to play a prominent role. Earlier, we argued that the 
outcomes of the STC-operation were in fact far more pronounced in terms of 
scale-enlargement than might be assumed if one takes into account the uncertainty 
and loss in autonomy which go with mergers. Elsewhere, Goedegebuure (1989) has 
argued that this can be accounted for in terms of strategic behaviour displayed by 
the HBO-institutions. Within the framework of HOAK and the HOOP planning 
documents, an institution's chances for survival are highest if it comprises all the 
'sectors' created by the government. Not only would this ensure the widest possible 
range of courses that an institution could offer, but also the greatest chance of 
attracting students) The government also made it clear that additional funding -
mostly in the form of project grants - would be allocated to those institutions that 
offered abroad study profile, i.e., large, multi-sectoral institutions. The mergers that 
were realized towards the end of the STC-process - when the HOAK-philosophy 
began to take firm ground - confirm this strategic behaviour. The mergers that 
occurred after the formal end of STC without exception can be explained from this 
point of view. At the moment, around 70% of all students in non-university higher 
education are enrolled within the 24 (28%) largest institutions. If the assumption 
holds that merger behaviour isgeared towards ensuring a future competitive edge, 
or at least creating a power position as strong as possible in terms of course-offerings 
in relation to other institutions, it can be reasonably expected that a new round of 
mergers will occur in the near future (possibly bringing the number of institutions 
down to some 25) if the government proposals regarding the changes in the 
WHW-bill are supported by parliament. Above we described how the 'sector- 
concept' was dropped and how it will be replaced by a register. This means that 
every institution can offer all the courses itwants; courses it thinks will be profitable 
in terms of student attraction, etc. At present, available sectors within institutions 
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place a barrier to this, and 'protect' (intended or not) quite a number of small(er) 
institutions in the geographical neighbourhood f large, multi-sectoral institutions. 
Since these larger institutions at present do not 'possess' all sectors, the smaller ones 
are in no direct danger from their big brothers, as these cannot respass on their 
educational turf. If this barrier is removed, it is highly likely, for the reasons 
discussed above, that the large institutions will enter these fields of study (e.g., higher 
economic and administrative education), making life for the small ones extremely 
difficult. Merger is then one of the most likely available options for these small 
institutions to at least partly ensure their survival. If they do not merge, the chances 
are that they will be 'driven out of the market', to use an economic phrase. Only 
those few very specialized small institutions with high (international) reputations 
and strong selection policies because they are in high demand, e.g., hotel 
management in The Hague, and industrial design in Eindhoven, appear to be in a 
position to guard their niche. For the others, an independent future looks ominous if 
policies are to be implemented as they are presented now, and if our assumption 
about strategic behaviour is correct. If the policies are implemented, this can be 
easily tested. Another consequence of this - and certainly unintended from the 
government's point of view - is that it is questionable whether these developments 
will result in the envisaged diversity, since what could happen is that institutions will 
be 'crowded out' of the market hrough duplication of their course-offerings. In 
terms of diversity this is a zero-sum game. 
The effects of changes in the government's higher education policy with respect to 
diversity are, however, not only limited to the HBO-sector. Two points are worth 
noting here, with respect o diversity within both the university and HBO-sector, 
and between universities and HBO-institutions. First, it remains to be seen whether 
the 'within' diversity of course-offerings will develop in the inter-institutional 
competitive setting envisaged by the government's policy. Research in the United 
States, often used as proof to the statement that a 'market-like' system increases 
diversity, can equally be used to prove the opposite. Birnbaum (1983: 68), in 
reviewing the literature on this topic (Anderson 1977; Baldridge et al. 1978; 
Hodgkinson 1971; Martin 1969), states that: 
The work of the critical analysts and the empirical researchers can be cited to support claims that 
diversity inhigher education is decreasing, is increasing, orhas remained constant. Scholarship ofthe 
early 1970s and before tends to endorse findings uggesting diminished diversity; more recent works are 
more optimistic. 
In his own contribution, Birnbaum uses the natural selection model in which 
institutional diversity in higher education isdirectly related to the environment. He 
concludes that for American higher education a scenario in which diversity will have 
decreased by the year 2000, in which there will be fewer institutional types, and 
institutions will look more and more alike, is more probable than a scenario in 
which diversity will be maintained. According to Birnbaum, the environment will 
become more uniform, and institutional diversity is likely to be reduced as a result 
(1983: 144-145, xii). A somewhat similar stance, though on a more general level, is 
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taken by DiMaggio and Powell (1983; for a discussion of their approach, see the 
article by Meek). This, of course, poses the fundamental research question of 
whether the policy changes recently introduced or about to be introduced in the 
Dutch system will indeed lead to an increase in diversity. On the one hand, one can 
argue that in a more 'free' context, institutions will search for niches through 
specialization and profiles, according to the basic thesis of the market-philosophy, 
thus increasing diversity. On the other hand, one can argue that, in order to reduce 
the uncertainty confronting them, institutions will copy the behaviour of successful 
competitors, thus generating a system in which the various organizations become 
more similar instead of more diverse. In terms of risk-aversion and investment- 
costs, the latter option certainly isthe cheapest. A clear example of this can again be 
found in the HBO-sector following the STC-operation. Confronted with their newly 
found freedom the institutions did not engage in a variety of new, innovative 
activities, but, according to the intentions stated in the 1989 development plans, to a 
very large extent all opted for internationalization, extension of contract research 
and teaching (the 'entrepreneurial approach'), etc. 6 In other words, they all 
emphasized those areas which, at that time, were highlighted as the key areas an 
institution had to engage in if it were to be an institution that counted: developments 
which certainly do not support the assumption that through deregulation 
institutions will opt for differentiating behaviour. 
Second, what goes for institutional behaviour within the same 'league' also goes 
for the behaviour between the two leagues. It has been observed that binary systems 
by their nature are basically unstable, and often contain the seeds of their own 
destruction (Meek and Goedegebuure 1989). Certainly, Australia is an example of 
this. With respect to the Dutch situation, both elements of 'upward' and 
'downward' academic drift can be observed. Regarding the upward academic drift, 
HBO-institutions, and their intermediate body the HBO-Council, are at present 
putting pressure on the minister to include research as a legitimate task for them in 
the WHW-bill, thereby going exactly the same way as both colleges of advanced 
education i Australia nd polytechnics in Britain have gone. Or, in terms of Neave 
(1983), they display the dynamics towards integration i  the 'noble' sector. The 
recent proposals by the minister to separate t aching from research funding, and to 
allocate research budgets on the basis of a competitive system in which the quality of 
the proposal plays an essential part, could be an interesting case. The binary divide is 
to remain, in the view of the minister, but what happens if HBO-institutions join in 
the competitive process? Can NWO (the organization that is to allocate alarge part 
of the research budget) exclude HBO-applicants simply because of their binary 
position? If the system is to be based on the quality of the research to be undertaken, 
this seems hardly a viable option, and could certainly be questioned under the equal 
rights regulations operating inthe Netherlands. Certainly, in the fields of humanities 
or social sciences, where no extensive infrastructure is necessary, this is not a 
far-fetched conjuncture, specially if we note that the boundaries between applied 
and fundamental research in these fields are highly blurred in the university system. 
The basic question in this is of course whether HBO-institutions will decide that 
their strength and legitimate role can be found in their relationship with the original 
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reference groups, thus stressing the vocational element of the curriculum, or 
whether they will opt for the struggle with the major league as has happened inother 
countries. This 'choice', if we can call it that, cannot be seen in isolation from the 
downward academic drift that can be observed inthe Netherlands. As in many other 
countries, Dutch universities engage in traditional vocational education with respect 
to medicine and dentistry, which by definition have little to do with academia. 
However, more recently, universities have also engaged in all sorts of applied 
sciences like journalism, nursing, leisure studies, etc., which seem to fit rather 
awkwardly with the strict binary divide the minister has in mind. But, these are areas 
for which a market demand exists. Such developments are, of course, athorn in the 
eye of HBO. Again, one can wonder whether a system in which every institution is 
free to develop courses with the only restriction being a sufficient quality will result 
in increased iversity or copying behaviour. If prestige remains tightly tied to 
research achievements, and if that is the area in which resources can be obtained, 
upward academic drift remains a viable option in the Dutch situation. If binary 
divisions remain blurred in terms of educational provision, and there appears to be 
no solid argument in a more market-driven system that this will not be the case, then 
diversity will not increase ither. 
Our proposition regarding the inter-institutional re ationships referred to above 
relates to the following. Since the changes in Dutch higher education policy do not 
really alter the existing dependencies between the government and the higher 
education institutions, but enhance the competition between institutions, institut- 
ions are more likely to engage in copying behaviour. Thus, they are more likely to 
become similar rather than different, because through this behavioural ttitude, 
based on survival, resource dependence, resource max!mization, and strategy, they 
are more likely to assure survival and a sufficient amount of resources than if they 
engage in differentiating behaviour. 
This, however, does not imply that there is some sort of 'iron law' through which 
the end result will be a completely homogeneous group of higher education 
institutions in a stable state. First of all, for institutions to engage in copying 
behaviour, there has to be something to copy, that is, some institutions at stage n will 
be 'better', more innovative, or whatever label one wants to use to indicate a 
difference between institutions. If other institutions decide to copy this, it by 
definition implies that those institutions from which something is to be copied, are 
successful, thus generating extra resources, be it money, prestige, etc. If, then, at 
stage n+ 1, the other institutions have copied the successful elements, the original, 
first (group of) institutions will still be better placed in terms of resources, thereby 
being better placed to create the organizational 's ack' from which to develop anew 
competitive dge. This line of reasoning starts from the assumption that higher 
education institutions are not equal, that hierarchies exist, and that these to a large 
extent determine the possibilities of evolutionary growth. Green (1980: 77), 
borrowing the term from Riesman, describes this as the 'reptilian procession': 
Certain institutions will initiate reform .... Other institutions, seeing what has been done, will follow in 
the same path, reaching implementation usually about the time that he original innovator has et offin 
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a new direction. Those institutions at the head of the procession, however, are not there by chance. They 
are first usually because they occupy a position of high status in a system of educational stratification. 
Certainly, in Dutch higher education, hierarchies do exist; there are reputational 
differences between universities, as well as between HBO-institutions. For example, 
the HBO-Council first discusses policy initiatives with the so-called 'group of eleven' 
(the eleven largest institutions) before discussing them with the others. And in the 
university sector, the older universities by and large occupy the more esteemed 
positions. The interesting point in this of course is that, although most of the time it 
is presented the other way round, these institutions did not obtain their reputation 
by being just old(er), but because of the fact that throughout the years (or centuries) 
they have been able to attract high-class cholars to work in their institutions. In a 
way, this is but a variant on the 'Matthew effect' (the richer get richer), but 
nevertheless it appears to be true. In this sense it would be an oversimplification to 
view higher education institutions as united, unitary actors, since by nature there 
exists a special relationship between the academic staff member and the institution. 
We will elaborate on this by addressing the fourth type of relationship: the intra- 
institutional relationship. 
The intra-institutional relationship 
The system of higher education and research displays some peculiarities as a 
consequence of 'the special nature of knowledge'. In short, the organization of 
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'knowledge' is like a large matrix structure, organized along the dimensions of 
scientific disciplines on the one hand and educational nd research institutions and 
government organizations on the other (see Figure 4). We could call these the 
academic and the administrative dimensions, respectively. 
The matrix structure has consequences onthe level of the individual university. 
First, the matrix structure more or less repeats itself in the twofold structure of 
universities; on the one hand the 'bureaucratic' organization of the institution, on 
the other hand the structure of the academic, disciplinary field. The academic side of 
universities i , according to Clark (1983: 17): '[a] fiat structure of loosely coupled 
parts. . ,  a federation, or perhaps even a coalition, rather than a . . .  bureaucracy'. 
Even though in the 'theory of political behaviour' all organizations are coalitions 
(since each individual participates with a view to his/her personal utility), the special 
character of academic organization must be noted; as Clark, Whitley and others 
have remarked, it resembles a 'craft' or 'guild' structure more than a bureaucratic 
structure (Clark 1983:113; Kogan 1984: 62; Whitley 1984: 14-15). Which means, in 
this case, that legitimate power relations are discipline-rooted rather than 
institution-based. Like the workshops of medieval guild-masters, the primary 
operating unit is the chair or the basic unit. 7 In such operating units hierarchical 
relationships do exist, but they only comprise afew layers. Between operating units 
relationships are mostly horizontal, primarily with other units of the same 
discipline. The units of a discipline together form a major part of the 'national 
subfield': the community of scientists in a discipline, who together exert power over 
its members and deal out reputations, e.g., by means of peer eview (Whitley 1984). 
This control over its employees from outside the institution, with its emphasis on 
expertise and academic freedom, makes the situation of the administrative side of 
the university rather awkward: it can neither control the primary processes of 
teaching and research in detail, nor has it exclusive tights and possibilities for this 
task. Rather, it has to share the influence on the primary processes with the national 
subfield. All this makes the chair or the basic unit not only the focal point in a 
university, but also 'unusually strong and central' (Clark 1983:31-32) in decision- 
making processes. Second, the matrix structure divides the academic side of a 
university, in its turn, along disciplinary lines. It is tightly suggested that: 'It]he core 
membership unit in academic systems i discipline-centered', because: '[i]t is more 
costly to leave one's field of expertise than to leave one's university or college... '  
(Clark 1983: 33, 30). Therefore, the disciplinary lines in universities are real 
cleavages. 
In the context of the changes confronting the Dutch higher education system, the 
intra-institutional re ationships raise some problems. To a large extent government 
policy focuses on the institutional level, i.e., the institution as a whole. Institutions 
are supposed to develop profiles, engage in innovative and differentiating 
behaviour, etc. However, the most important element incorporated in the new 
approach, the introduction of a quality register and the interconnecting of funding 
with quality assessment outcomes, is directed at the study programme l vel. This 
leads to a fundamental imbalance in the policy approach. As we have indicated 
earlier, the institutional dministrative elite to a large extent is in favour of the 
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proposed changes embedded in the HOAK-philosophy - an attitude that relates 
very well with notions of self-interest and power positions, since it furthers the role 
of the administrator in the institution (see also Meek and Goedegebuure 1989). 
Nevertheless, the HOAK-policy hardly changes the existing dependencies between 
administration and academics. 8 Funding is still tied to the academic side of the 
institution, and, as we have argued above, academic nterest lies with the discipline 
and not with the institution. The favourable attitudes of administrators to the 
change process set in motion can certainly not be assumed to pertain to the 
academic part of the institution. This is not altered by the fact that funds are 
allocated as a lump-sum to the institution and are reallocated by the administrative 
(central) level to the faculties. It is impossible to predict what effects this imbalance 
contained inthe government approach will have on the higher education enterprise. 
One can imagine an intensified struggle between the central administration  the 
one hand, trying through the implementation f (strategic) development plans, 
mission statements, and the ensuing managerial tools to move the institution to new 
avenues in the changing higher education market, thereby emphasizing the notion 
of the higher education enterprise, and the academic side of the institution on the 
other hand, being not really interested inthe fashion-of-the-day, butin furthering its 
own position in the academic system by performing those activities that bring them 
respect and recognition of their peers. It cannot beforehand be assumed that these 
activities will correlate fully with those envisaged by the institutional management. 
In this respect he intra-institutional division of power and the possible changes 
therein, because of the overall policy change in Dutch higher education, will be an 
interesting and fruitful area of research in the empirical stage of the comparative 
project. That the concept of power is difficult to deal with in empirical research 
should not keep us from addressing it, as it plays a key role in the institutional 
dynamism which to an important extent influences the outcomes of government- 
induced change in the higher education system. 
Concluding remarks 
By identifying four relationships which we consider important in addressing policy 
change and its outcomes, we have tried to demonstrate that a framework isneeded 
in which system change is approached as a multi-level phenomenon. To borrow 
from some earlier work (Meek and Goedegebuure 1989b), change is often analyzed 
in terms of power available to one actor (mostly government) toimpose its will on 
others (the institutions) despite opposition. We propose a somewhat different 
theoretical view of change: the degree and extent of change in a complex system such 
as higher education, are dependent upon the interaction of interests, strategic 
behaviour, preferences, and ideologies of all involved. The more these factors tend 
to coincide or converge, the more likely it is that change will be extensive and 
ubiquitous. A view of change that concentrates on one group of people doing 
something to another group of people is too narrow. The question is not solely one 
of (state) intervention, but of how and why conditions prevail to the degree that 
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extensive and far-reaching change becomes possible, or, on the other hand, why 
these conditions do not arise. The four level framework presented above in no way is 
complete or fool-proof. It can, however, hopefully, be of use in focusing attention 
on the conditions and relationships that play a central role in change in higher 
education systems. 
Notes 
1. For a discussion on the development of quality assessment systems in the Netherlands, ee 
Goedegebuure, Maassen, and Westerheijden 1990. 
2. According to Friedrich's law of anticipated consequences, however, it is to be expected that the 
Ministry reckons with the opinion of the parliamentary majority. 
3. A higher education lobby does exist in the Netherlands, certainly with respect to denominational 
and agricultural institutions ( ee Goedegebuure and Vos 1988, regarding the HBO-sector). 
4. Of course, this is not true for the direct market relationships that exist in the areas of contract 
teaching and contract research. However, this is but a minor part of the higher education budget. 
5. It should be noted that Dutch students by and large do not make their choice for an institution on 
the basis of quality arguments, but on geographical location. 
6. Data obtained from a preliminary analysis of HBO-development plans. 
7. The description ofthe relations in universities are geared to the European, and more specifically the 
Dutch, situation, rather than the American situation. For a comparison, see Clark 1983. 
8. In Kogan's words: 'without active academics securing the reputation ofthe institution the managers 
would have nothing worthwhile to manage. There is, therefore, a process of exchange between those 
who manage and those who provide the main academic outputs of the institutions. They provide the 
expertise upon which the institution thrives or fails. The institution provides the resources enabling 
them to perform their academic tasks' (1984: 64). 
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